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the primary common-law rule in 
of a bequest, 
vesting of title 
for vested rather than 
established. (Prob. Code, 
in remaindermen and the Dr4~fererwe 
contingent remainders is 
§§ 28, 123.) 
[2] Remainders -Vested and Contingent Remainders. -A re-
mainder limited without words of condition to a class of 
persons, such as "children," one or more of whom are in exist-
ence and ascertained, is vested, though subject to be divested 
in part by the coming into existence or ascertainment of other 
members of the class. 
[3a, 3b] Id.-Vested and Contingent Remainders.-The mere fact 
that takers of a postponed gift are described by a class desig-
nation such as children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews and 
the like does not give rise to any implied condition of survival; 
a gift of a future interest to a class may be vested in interest 
though possession and enjoyment are postponed, the whole con-
cept of a remainder vested subject to open being based on such 
view. (Disapproving Estate of Cavarly, 119 Cal. 406 [51 P. 
429]; Estate of Clark, 64 Cal.App.2d 636 [149 P.2d 465]; 
Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 [108 P. 287]; and Estate of 
Hamon, 136 Cal.App. 517 [29 P.2d 326].) 
[4] Wills-Estate or Interest Passing Under Will-Vested and 
Contingent Gifts.-If a testator expressly provides that a class 
gift is to vest prior to the time when the class closes, his 
intent will be effectuated. 
[5] Id.-Estate or Interest Passing Under Will-Vested and Con-
tingent Gifts.-As to devises of land, there is no presumption 
that, in a gift to a class where distribution is postponed, there 
(1] See Cal.Jur., § 291 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § 1218. 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Life Remainders and Reversions, 
§ 22 et seq.; Am.Jur., Life Estates, Remainders and Reversions, 
§ 66 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills,§ 382; [2, 3] Remainders,§ 4; 
[4] Wills, §381; [5] Wills, §380; [6-8] Wills, §386; [9, 11] Adop-
tion, §30; [10] Adoption, §39; [12, 13] Wills, §329; [14, 15] 
Adoption, § 37; [16] Wills, § 266. 
persons. 
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that the members of the class must 
of distribution; courts may 
a condition of in the case of 
distribution to a future time, 
not do so in the case of a to named 
!d.-Estate or Interest Passing Under WUI-Vested and Con-
tingent Gifts.-Where testatrix' will cn:ated a trust to pay her 
niece the net income from of the estate, a provision 
that on the niece's death the trust should cease merely states 
that the trust IS for her and while the words thereafter 
directing that the corpus shall "belong" to and "be delivered" 
to the life tenant's the remaindermen, may encom-
pass ownership in other situations, they are not technical terms 
hut ones common in everyday usage and may refer to pos-
session only; such construction is reasonable, leaving the rule 
of early vesting applicable. 
[7] !d.-Estate or Interest Passing Under Will-Vested and Con-
tingent Gifts.-The expression "belong to," as used in a will 
directing that on a life tenant's death the trust property 
"shall belong to and be delivered to" her children, adds noth-
ing to the phrase "go to" such as in a devise to one for life 
and the remainder to go to another; nor is there any persua-
sive significance to the remaindermen being referred to as 
child or children, this merely indicating that testatrix wished 
to keep the class open to any additional children of the life 
tenant, who had only one child when the will was made and 
when testatrix died. 
[8] Id.-Estate or Interest Passing Under Will-Vested and Con-
tingent Gifts.-Under testatrix' will creating a trust for the 
benefit of her niece and on the niece's death the trust to cease 
and "shall belong to and be delivered to" her child or children, 
the quoted words did not give rise to a condition of survival 
where to give them a contingent construction would be out of 
harmony with the equal treatment of relatives which testatrix, 
in other provisions of the will, appeared to have had in mind. 
[9] Adoption-E:ffect.-It is the policy to accord to adopted chil-
dren the same status as natural children. (Civ. Code, §§ 228, 
229.) 
[10] Id.-Inheritance.-An adopted child succeeds to the estate 
of its adoptive parent in the same manner as a child born of 
such parent. 
[11] Id.-E:ffect.-The effect of an adoption is to establish between 
the adopting parents and the child the legal relation of parent 
----------------------------
[10) See Oa!.Jur.2d, Adoption of Children, §§ 501 51; Am.Jur., 
Adoption of Children, § 59 et seq. 
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and child, with all the legal consequences of that relation, 
including the child's right to take the family name of the per-
son adopting it. 
[12] Wills--Designation of Takers--"Children."-The status of 
an adopted child should be of some significance in construing 
a will since the testator may be said to realize the possibility 
of adoption and its effect; if the statute declares that the 
adoptee shall be deemed a "child" of the adopting parents as 
fully as though born to them in lawful wedlock, it is properly 
one of the circumstances in the light of which a devise to the 
"children" of the adopting parents should be read. 
[13] !d.-Designation of Takers-"Children."-A letter written 
by testatrix, seven years before execution of her will, from 
which it may be inferred that when she made a bequest to 
the "child or children" of her niece she intended to include 
any children that the niece might adopt, may properly be 
considered in construing the meaning of such words. 
[14] Adoption-Collateral Attack.-An adoption order of a sister 
state which has stood for many years may not be collaterally 
attacked where the alleged irregularities are not of sufficient 
importance. 
[15] Id.-Validity.-Where an objector has not established that 
an adoption order of a sister state was void, it must be pre-
sumed to have been valid. 
[16] Wills--Construction-Law Governing.-The construction of 
a will, with reference to property in this state, is governed 
by California law. (Prob. Code, § 100.) 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Santa Clara County decreeing distribution of an estate and 
settling the final account. M. G. Del Mutolo, Judge. Reversed 
with directions. 
James D. Adams, Albert J. Moorman, McCutcheon, Thomas, 
Matthew, Griffiths & Greene, Dudley Robinson, Caryl Warner, 
Warner & Sutton and Barbara Warner for Appellants. 
John L. Bradley, Sam J. Whiting, Jr., Crimmins, Kent, 
Draper & Bradley, Schwartz & Alschuler and Leon S. 
Alschuler for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-These are appeals from a decree settling the 
final account and distributing the property of the estate of 
Jane Stanford who died testate in 1905. 
By her will, dated July 28, 1903, decedent bequeathed 
$2,000,000 in trust to the Union Trust Company (now Wells 
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Fargo Bank) as trustee, as follows: ( 1) The net income of 
one-half thereof to be paid her brother Ariel Lathrop dur-
ing his life. The trust was to cease upon his death and the 
corpus thereof was to belong to and be delivered to his named 
relatives. (2) To pay to her niece, ,Jennie Lawton, the net 
income from one-third of the other half for her lifetime 
and "upon her death [the] trust shall cease" and one-third 
of the corpus "shall belong and be delivered to the child or 
children of" Jennie. (3) The same provision was made as 
to her niece, Amy Hansen, as to one-third of the half. (4) The 
net income from the remaining one-third was to be paid to 
Daniel and Amy Gunning, children of decedent's deceased 
niece, Christine Gunning. until they reached a certain age 
when the corpus was to go to them, but if either died before 
attaining the specified age. then to the children of the one 
dying. Thereafter gifts were made to various persons. The 
residue was bequeathed to Stanford University and pro-
vision was made for $100 to any contestant who attempted 
to impair, invalidate or set aside the will and any amount 
such contestant would have received, except for the contest, 
was to go to Stanford University, the residuary legatee. 
Probate proceedings were commenced and on April 6, 
1906, a decree of partial distribution was rendered ordering 
"that there be distributed to the respective legatees ... 
upon their respective legacies the following respective amounts, 
namely: To the Union Trust Company [the trustee named 
in the will] $1,900,000 in trust and upon the trusts provided 
for by" her will "said trusts being expressed in said will 
as follows." Then followed the exact wording of the will 
above mentioned. On May 1, 1908, the court decreed the 
settlement of the third and final account and ordered final 
distribution. The decree recited that all legatees had been 
paid their legacies in full, with the exception of Stanford 
University, and ordered all the rest and remainder of the 
estate known or unknown to be delivered to Stanford Uni-
versity. 
Jennie Lawton ( (2) above) had one child, Daniel, who 
died in 1926, before the death of his mother, bequeathing his 
interest in the estate to his mother, Jennie. Shortly there-
after Jennie died and on October 7, 1927, the court decreed 
that on Jennie's death the trust had ended and ordered that 
the corpus of the trust be delivered to Jennie's executor, 
stating that in its "opinion" the interest of Daniel "vested" 
upon the death of the testatrix. Stanford University ap-
died in 
Ruth Barton. as her children, 
pr<Dce:ea:m~J:s in a New York court, Aimee Gunning Reyn-
aud her two Aimee now 
Minnie Rochester. Hansen died in 
her the persons she had 
The court decreed that corpus of the trust 
be distributed to the persons, Aimee Reynolds, Minnie 
Rochester and Aimee ihat the trust as to (1), 
(2) and ( 4) had terminated and the remainder interests had 
been distributed; that Ruth the successor of Walter, 
the son of Amy Hansen, should recf'ive nothing as Walter 
had predeceased his mother. Rnth Barton and Stanford 
University appeal. 
Ruth Barton contends that the interest of Walter passed 
to her although he predeceased his mother, Amy Hansen, 
the life tenant of the property, be,,ause the remainder was 
vested when the testatrix, Jane Stanford, died; that the 
decrees in 1906 and 1908 distributing the property so con-
strued the testatrix' will; that the 1927 decree with respect 
to Jennie Lawton, which determined that the interest of 
the remainderman, Daniel, passed to his legatee, Jennie, 
although he died before the life tenant, Jennie, is res judicata 
as to Stanford University. 
Thus the main question presented is whether the remainder 
to Walter was vested as to title in him at the death of the 
testatrix with the right of possession postponed, or, stated 
another way, whether \Valter's survival of the life tenant. 
his mother, was a contingency upon which depended his or 
his successor's interest as remaindermen. 
[1] In construing the language of a bequrst, such as we 
have here, the primary common law rule in favor of early 
vesting of title in remaindermen and the preference for 
vested rather than contingent remainders is firmly established 
in this state. (Williams V. wauams, 73 Cal. 99 [14 P. 394]; 
Estate of Rider, 199 Cal. 742 [251 P. 805] ; In re Shoemake, 
211 Cal. 457 [295 P. 830] ; Estate of Ritzman, 186 Cal. 567 
[199 P. 783]; Estate of Riemer, 69 Cal.App.2d 634 [159 P.2d 
677]; Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152 [177 P.2d 299]; 
Estate of Whitney, 176 Cal. 12 [169 P. 399]; Estate of Law-
rence, 17 Cal.2d 1 [108 P.2d 893]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock 
Oil Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 222 [270 P.2d 604] ; Rest., Property, 
§ 243; Simes and 
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This rule is in section 
Code which '"l'estamentary 




sumed to vest at the testator's death." in 
part: "A a elass includes every 
person testator's death; but 
when the a future it in-
cludes also all persons within the before 
the time to which is postponed." [2] And 
it has been said noted authors on t}Je subject, with the 
citation of numerous that: "A remainder limited 
without words of condition to a class of persons, such as 
'children,' one or more of whom is in existence and ascer-
is vested, though subject to be divested in part by the 
coming into existence or ascertainment of other members 
of the class. This is the typical vested remainder subject to 
open. Thus, if land is devised to A for life, remainder to 
the children of A, the remainder vests in the children as 
soon as they are in existence, although the other children 
born to A will eventually participate in the enjoyment of 
the estate. V sually this issue is involved when one of the 
children of A has died before his ancestor, and the question 
to be decided is whether the heirs of the deceased child take 
a share in the remainder or whether it all passes to those 
children who S?trvive A. If there were a condition precedent 
of survival to the time of distribution, then the heirs of the 
deceased child could not take. 'I'he conclusion that the re-
mainder is vested, and not snbject to any condition precedent, 
is regarded as being based upon the theory that there is a 
person in being to whom the seisin conld pass. While the 
interests of the unborn or unascertained persons can hardly 
be spoken of as vested in any possible sense of the word, the 
remainder is said to be vested, since the interest of the 
ascertained person may be regarded as vested. This proposi-
tion can be stated in another way: the mere fact that the 
entire membership of the class cannot be determined until 
some later time when the interest becomes possessory does 
not mean that there is a condition precedent that the existing 
members of the class must survive until that time in order to 
partake of present ownership. Only rarely does a court reach 
a contrary result." (Emphasis added; Simes and Smith, The 
Law of Future Interests (1956), § 146; see Rest., Property, 
§§ 256, 257, 260.) (3a] And: " the cases indicate 
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clearly that the mere fact that takers of a postponed gift 
are described by a class designation such as children, grand-
children, nieces, nephews, and the like, does not give rise to 
any implied condition of survival. In other words, a gift of 
a future interest to a class may be vested in interest even 
though possession and enjoyment are postponed. The whole 
concept of a remainder vested subject to open is based upon 
such a view, and the overwhelming weight of authority is 
to the effect that gifts to a class, without any words of con-
dition, are vested when there is some member of the class in 
being." (Id., § 578.) [4] And further: "An examination of 
the decisions indicates the following conclusions: First, if 
a testator expressly provides that a class gift is to vest prior 
to the time when the class closes, his intent will be effectuated. 
[5] Second, as to devises of land, there is no presumption 
that, in a gift to a class where distribution is postponed, there 
is a condition precedent that the members of the class must 
survive the period of distribution; as to bequests, at least in 
some jurisdictions, courts may occasionally imply a condi-
tion precedent of survivorship in the case of a gift to a 
class with distribution postponed to a future time where 
they would not do so in the case of a gift to named persons. 
"It is to be noted that the rules of construction which 
separate the problem of vesting of class gifts and the problem 
of the closing of classes are not mere technical doctrines 
derived from lifeless concepts of property law. The court, 
in a very real way, is effectuating what the normal testator 
would desire. Consider the typical case where a testator 
leaves his residuary estate to his son A for life, remainder 
to A's children. Suppose A has two children at the testator's 
death. One of them dies before A, and two more children 
are born. In many instances the testator has not contemplated 
these changes in circumstances. Yet, had he done so, he 
probably would have wished to include in the class all those 
children living at his own death plus all those subsequently 
born. If we regard the time of vesting of the class and the 
time of its closing as one and the same, this wish cannot be 
effectuated. The children, as of the testator's death, are but 
two. The children, as of the time of A's death, are three. 
But, if we apply the rule that the remainder vests in the two 
living at the testator's death, subject to open and let in 
after-born children, we let in all four children. All stirpes 
are represented." (Id., § 654.) In In re Shoemake, 211 Cal. 
457, 460 [295 P. 830], the court was considering whether the 
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successors of the life tenant's daughter, who died before the 
life tenant, would take where, under a deed, the remainder was 
to the heirs of the life tenant, the court saying in the course 
of discussion: "At that time Lela Barnett [the daughter] 
was living and could have been specially mentioned ; she was 
not. She might have been clearly identified as the holder of 
a vested remainder by the use of the term 'children' without 
other language, but was not. What could the grantor have 
had in mind 1 Certainly not the intention to provide for 
Lela Barnett in particular, but in general for his descendents, 
including Lela Barnett. The intention to have his property 
go to persons in his own line of descent seems plain. If, how-
ever, a vested remainder came to Lela Barnett, it was pos-
sible for her P'tior to her actual possession of the property 
[emphasis that of the court] to alien her future interests, 
so that it might go to strangers." (Emphasis added.) In 
Estate of Backesto, 71 Cal.App. 409 [235 P. 670] the testator's 
will bequeathed a life estate to his wife and "after her death, 
the property shall be sold, and the proceeds shall be equally 
divided" between "the children" of certain brothers aud 
sisters of the testator and his wife. A child of one of the 
brothers died before the wife who was the life tenant. The 
court held that the successor of the child dying before the life 
tenant took the child's share, stating at page 416: "All 
these sections [various sections of the Civil Code•] show the 
unmistakable intention of the statutory law to declare that 
a devise or bequest shall vest at the testator's death unless 
some other intention is expressed in the will. This policy 
has been recognized and approved by the California decisions. 
(Williams v. Williams, 73 Cal. 99, 102 [14 P. 394]; In re De 
Vries, 17 Cal.App. 184, 190 [119 P. 109] ; MiUer v. Oliver, 
54 Cal.App. 495, 498 [202 P. 168] ; Estate of Campbell, 149 
Cal. 712, 717 [87 P. 573].) The same rule is approved in 23 
R.C.L., pp. 530, 535, Doe etc. v. Considine, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 
458, 475 [18 L.Ed. 469, see also Rose's U.S. Notes], and 
McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 378 [28 L.Ed. 1015, 5 S.Ct. 
652] ; 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 382; and nu-
merous other authorities which we deem it unnecessary to 
cite. It is accepted as a settled principle by such text-writers 
as 2 Jarman on Wills, p. 841; 2 Williams on Executors, 7th 
ed., p. 1344, Alexander on Wills, § 996, Minor on Real 
Property, § 749, and Tiedeman on Real Property, § 302. 
• Including tile text now in Probate Code, section 123, ftflnl. 
of 
to 
the description at 
that the estate vests in them as they 
come in esse the is postponed to a future 
" In v. 154 Cal. 186 P. 300], the 
decree of distribution that on the termination of a 
trust, the duration of which was measured the 
of the the corpus was "to go" to the testator's 
widow. The court held that the widow possessed an interest, 
which was not upon her survivorship until the 
termination of the trust, and having died before that 
time, nevertheless had an interest the life of the trust 
which passed to her heirs or devisees. In Estate of Wallace, 
11 Cal.2d 338 [79 P.2d 1094], the decree of distribution 
distributed the property in trust with directions to pay the 
testator's widow a specified periodic sum out of the income, 
and also directed that two named children receive the balance 
of the income, and upon the death of the life tenant-widow 
the trust was to terminate and the trustee "shall distribute 
the balance'' of the trust property to the two children. One 
of the children predeceased the widow but the court held that 
her share passed to her heirs as a vested remainder, reasoning 
that the words "shall distribute" (the direction to the trustee) 
referred to the distribution or delivery of the possession of 
the property rather than creating a contingency of survivor-
ship or the passage of title. In Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App. 
2d 152 [ 177 P .2d 299], the will set up a trust and provided 
that the trust should end on the death of named persons 
and "thereupon and at once the ... trustee shall grant and 
deliver" the corpus to the "children" of Frederic and Edith, 
the testator's son and wife. One of the children died before 
the life tenants. The decree of distribution was somewhat 
differently phrased. The court held that the deceased son's 
heirs or devisees took his interest, stating at page 161: ''The 
law is well settled that vested remainders can be created in a 
class the membership of which is not complete at the effective 
date of the grant or devise, so that similar vested interests 
accrue to those who, by later entry therein, fall within the 
class. Thus, in the present case, even if the 'after-born' 
clause referred to the remainders as well as to the trust (the 
trial court found it referred only to the trust), that factor 
would not indicate that the remainders were contingent. In 
such a case the remainders could well be vested in the three 
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children of Frederic and had there been any later 
entrants into the class were not), their interests would 
have vested as and by virtue of the conse-
increase in the class membership, the vested interests 
of the preceding members would have been proportionately 
diminished. It is well settled that the fact that the interests 
members of the class may be thus diminished does 
not convert the interest of such. members to contingent re-
mainders. In such event the remainders are vested subject 
to a condition subsequent. This is the rule of the Restate-
ment. In 2 Restatement of the Law of Property, section 157, 
it is provided that: 'A remainder can be (a) indefeasibly 
vested; or (b) vested subject to open .... ' As an illustration 
of clause (b) the Restatement states: 'A, owning Blackacre 
in fee simple absolute, transfers Blackacre "to B for life, 
remainder to the children of B." B has a child C. C has a 
remainder vested subject to open and let in other children 
born to B.' " (See also to the same import, Estate of Welch, 
83 Cal.App.2d 391 [188 P.2d 797]; Estate of Newman, 68 
Cal.A.pp. 420 [229 P. 898] ; Estate of Klein, 23 Cal.App.2d 
708 [74 P.2d 79]; Estate of Riemer, 69 Cal.App.2d 634 [159 
P.2d 677].) [3b] Estate of Cavarly, 119 Cal. 406 [51 P. 
629], apparently is to the contrary on its assumption that a 
gift of a future interest to a class was dependent on survival 
but it misconstrued the authority cited therefor (see 40 Cal. 
L.Rev. 58-59) and failed to apply a portion of the provisions 
of section 1337 of the Civil Code, now section 123 of the 
Probate Code, S1tpra. The same is true of Estate of Clark, 
64 Cal.App.2d 636 [149 P.2d 465]. Those cases ( Cavarly 
and Clark) and such cases as Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 
[108 P. 287], and Estate of Hamon, 136 Cal.App. 517 [29 
P.2d 326], are disapproved insofar as the question herein 
decided is concerned. Anglo California Nat. Bank v. Kidd, 
58 Cal.App.2d 651 [137 P.2d 460), and In re Rogers, 94 Cal. 
526 [29 P. 962], may be distinguished on the basis of the 
language in the instrument construed. Estate of Hartson, 
218 Cal. 536 [24 P.2d 171], and In re Winter, 114 Cal. 186 
[ 45 P. 1063], did not apply the erroneous rule of Estate of 
Cavarly, snpra, 119 Cal. 406, that in case of class gifts there 
is a condition of survivorship and may also be distinguished 
on the basis of the language used in the instruments construed. 
[6] The words of the will directing that on Mrs. Hansen's 
death the trust should cease is nothing more than a way of 
4& C.2d--41 
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saying that the trust is for her life. While the words there-
after directing that the corpus shall "belong" to and "be 
delivered'' to the' life tenant's children, the remaindermen, 
may encompass ownership in other situations (see, for 
example, Hackett v. Cahfornia Laundry, 7 Cal.App.2d Supp. 
757 [45 P.2d 833]; San Francisco v. McGovern, 28 Cal.App. 
491 [152 P. 980]: State Land Settlement Board v. Henderson, 
197 Cal. 470 [241 P. 560]; 10 C.J.S. 241), they are not tech-
nical terms but are ones which are common in everyday usage 
and may refer to possession only. Certainly that construc-
tion is reasonable, leaving the rule of early vesting applicable. 
This serves to distinguish Estate of Easter, 24 Cal.2d 191 
[148 P.2d 601]. In that case, the term to be construed was 
the technical word ''vest,'' and the clause in which it was 
contained did not appear in the will but had been added by 
the probate court in its distribution decree. It was, therefore, 
concluded that the word ''vest'' did not give rise to the appli-
cation of the early vesting rule, but referred to ownership. 
The situations in the present case and in the Easter case are 
thus different. The direction for delivery is an instruction 
to the trustee of the trust. [7] 'l'he expression ''belong to'' 
adds nothing to the phrase ''go to'' such as in a devise to 
A for life and the remainder to go to B. Nor do we attach 
any persuasive significance to the remaindermen being re-
ferred to as child or children. It merely indicates that the 
testator wished to keep the class open to any additional chil-
dren of Amy Hansen inasmuch as she had only one child when 
the will was made and when the testatrix died. 
Declaring the intent of the testatrix as the court must, the 
foregoing construction finds support in the will as a whole. 
The significance of the will's provisions can be appreciated 
in the light of the situation then existing with respect to the 
family of the testatrix, i.e., the Lathrop family. The testatrix 
had six brothers but no sisters, and, at the time of her death, 
only two of her brothers were alive, Charles, who had children, 
and Ariel, who did not. Of the four deceased brothers, only 
one, Daniel, had left issue. His children were Jennie Lawton, 
who, on the effective date of the will, had one child, Daniel; 
Amy Hansen, who had one child, Walter; and Christine 
Gunning, who had died leaving two children, Daniel and Amy 
Gunning. 
The will disposed of a substantial sum for the benefit of 
the members of the I1athrop family. One million was left to 
Charles as an outright gift. The other two million were 
Sept.1957] ESTATE OF STANFORD 
[49 C.2d 120; 315 P.2d 681] 
placed in trust. Ariel was to receive income from one million 
dollars for life, and it was provided that upon his death, "as 
he had no children or descendants,'' the trust as to that 
portion "shall cease and determine" and that the portion 
"shall belong to and be delivered to" Charles and the descend-
ants of Daniel, Charles to receive one-half, Jennie Lawton 
one-third of the other half, Amy Hansen another third of the 
second half and Daniel and Amy Gunning the final third of 
that half. As to the second million which was placed in trust. 
income from one-third was to be paid to Jennie Lawton for 
life, and it was provided that upon her death the trust as 
to that portion "shall cease and determine" and that tht> 
portion "shall belong to and be delivered to" her child or 
children. An identical provision, which is the one involved 
in the present case, was made with respect to another third 
of the second million in favor of Amy Hansen and her child 
or children. The final third of that million was left in trust 
to pay the income to Daniel and Amy Gunning until the 
younger reached the age of 25, at which time the trust involv-
ing this fund ''shall cease and determine'' and tht> fund 
''shall belong to and be dt>livered '' to them in equal shares; 
provided, however, that if either child should die prior to 
the date of distribution then his share to his children or if 
no children to the other, or if the survivor of the two children 
also dies prior to the date of distribution then to his or her 
children or "heirs at law." 
Following the above dispositions, the will left various be-
quests to the testatrix' secretary, servants and certain 
charities. In a subsequent paragraph the testatrix explained 
that "Since executing former wills, a Kind Providence has 
brought about more favorable conditions in the affairs of the 
Estate left me by my beloved husband, and for this reason 
I have greatly enlarged my gifts to the Leland Stanford 
,Junior University, and I now feel ,justified in enlarging, as 
I have done in this Will, my bequests to my relatives and 
friends and different charities, which have been ever dear to 
my heart." She then gave certain itt>ms of personal property 
and the residue of her estate to Stanford University. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that, as is sugge>sted by the 
testatrix' explanatory statement quoted above, her dominant 
purpose "now," that is, in making the will, was to enlarge 
gifts to the members of the r~athrop family. The manner in 
which the assets were disposed of reflects some intent to 
132 C.2d 
benefit the on a per 
the then existing facts with 
ence of issue. This of course, first indicated by the 
allotment of one million dollars for the benefit of each of the 
testatrix' two as well as for the descend-
ants of the deceased brother who had left issue. The 
plan may appear from the to the 
descendants of where the per 
pressly 
tion may be found in the provision disposing of the remainder 
after Ariel's life where the will, after explaining that 
Ariel had no children or descendants, divides the remainder 
equally between, on the one hand, Charles, who had children, 
and, on the other hand, the descendants of Daniel. The mat-
ter which might, at first glance, seem somewhat inconsistent 
with the suggested pattern is that the gifts benefiting Charles' 
branch of the family were made directly to him instead of his 
descendants, but this fact is explained. Unlike Daniel, 
Charles was alive, and, unlike Ariel, Charles had issue. The 
evidence shows that t.he testatrix had complete trust in 
Charles, and we would seem justified in assuming that she 
was confident that the gifts left to him would ultimately 
benefit his descendants on a per stirpes basis. 
Taken in the light of the foregoing, certain aspects of the 
will have significance in connection with the question whether 
a condition of survival was intended in the provision before us. 
[8] In the first place, it seems that the testatrix would 
not have intended that the descendants of brother Daniel 
should get more benefit from her property than the descend-
ants of Charles, or vice versa. Yet, such unequal treatment 
was entirely possible, so far as the testatrix knew, if the 
words "shall belong to and be delivered to" gave rise to a 
condition of survival. As we have seen, those words were 
used in every instance in which there was a remainder after 
an income trust, including the remainder following Ariel's 
life interest, where the corpus was to go in halves to Charles 
and to the named descendants of Daniel. 'rhus, if the lan-
guage in question made the dispositions contingent, and if 
Charles predeceased Ariel, the most which Charles' descend-
ants might expect would be the benefit of the one million 
dollars given outright to whereas the descendants 
of Daniel, were they to survive Ariel, would realize the benefit 
not only of the million provided for them initially, but also 
of their one-half million share of the remainder following 
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Ariel's interest. construction. 
if the named descendants or any of them, pre-
the share of the remainder going to thai 
would totally or partially fall into the 
even though left issue, whereas, should Charles 
:survive his descendants benefit from a million 
and a half dollars of the testatrix' money. 
In the second place, it appears that the testatrix would not 
have wished to treat unequally descendants of Daniels having 
the same to him. Yet, if she were held to have 
intended a condition of survival with respect to the re. 
mainders following the life interests of Jennie Lawton and 
Amy Hansen, such a situation could easily have arisen. For 
example, so far as the testatrix knew, all children of Jennie 
might die before her but leave children of their own, who 
would be entitled to nothing under the contingent construc-
tion, whereas, if Amy's children should survive her, their 
chile'- .~n might expect to benefit. Thus, great-grandchildren 
of Daniel would receive unequal treatment. In this connec-
tion, it should be noted that Daniel's great-grandchildren 
through Christine were expressly contemplated as possible 
beneficiaries under the provisions that, should Daniel or Amy 
Gunning die before reaching the age of 25, the deceased's 
share of corpus was to go to his or her children, if any. It 
should not therefore be supposed that the testatrix would 
have intended that Daniel's great-grandchildren through 
Jennie Lawton and Amy Hansen would not benefit if their 
parents failed to survive the intervening trusts. 
Another respect in which the will, as a whole, seems opposed 
to a contingent construction is the indication from the lan-
guage used therein that the property made available to the 
Lathrops should in no event fall into the residue. There 
would appear to be no question in this connection, so far as 
the outright gift to Charles is concerned. The same is true 
as to the gift to the Gunnings, since it was expressly provided 
that, should they die without issue before reaching the age 
of 25, their interest was to go "to the heirs at law" of the 
survivor. It is diffieult to see why the testatrix would have 
intended that Stanford be in a different position with respect 
to property disposed of by the other provisions. 
Finally, with reference specifically to the provision under 
consideration, it should be noted that, so far as the testatrix 
knew, it was possible that Walter would be the only child 
Amy Hansen would ever have and that Walter would pre-
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decease his mother, leaving children of his own. In such an 
event, if the testatrix made the remainder following Amy's 
life interest contingent on survival of Amy, Walter's children 
could not benefit from it, either through intestate succession 
or under a will which Walter might make in their favor, and 
the remainder would go to Stanford under the residuary 
clause. It is doubtful that the testatrix would have intended 
to use language making such a development possible, particu-
larly when, as we have seen, she expressly provided in the 
clause invnlving the Gunnings that, if either of them failed 
to survive the intervening trust, his children should take and 
that, if both of them died without issue before the end of the 
trust, their gift was not to go to Stanford but to the heirs at 
law of the survivor. Ruth Barton is, of course, in the same 
position as children of Walter would have been, had they been 
the claimants here. 
In short, the testatrix' intent in framing the will must be 
determined in the light of the eventualities which, so far as 
she was in a position to know, were possible, rather than in 
the light of what actually developed after her death, and, so 
viewed, a contingent construction of the words ''shall belong 
to and be delivered to" would seem to be out of harmony 
with the equal treatment of relatives which she appears to 
have had in mind. 
Since we have concluded that the lower court was in error 
in deciding that Ruth Barton did not take a portion of the 
remainder as successor of Walter Hansen, the son of Amy 
Hansen, who was alive when the testatrix died but predeceased 
his mother, it is not, therefore, necessary to discuss the con-
tention of Ruth Barton with regard to the effect of the 1906 
and 1927 decrees of partial distribution. 
Stanford University contends, contrary to the finding by 
the lower court, that the remaindermen of the devise to 
Amy Hansen could not include the persons adopted by her 
as her children. It will be recalled that Amy Hansen had 
the court approval of an adoption agreement entered in New 
York in 1924, after the death of the testatrix, by which she 
adopted her niece, Mrs. Reynolds, an adult, and the two 
minor children of Mrs. Reynolds, Aimee and Minnie Rochester. 
The adoption approval provided that the adoption "be allowed 
and confirmed and henceforth the said Aimee G. Reynolds, 
Aimee Christine Rochester and Minnie Devereaux Bond 
Rochester shall be regarded and treated in all respects as the 
children of said Aimee Lathrop Hansen." 
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It is clear from the authorities heretofore discussed that 
the class, children, was to remain open to additional children 
after the death of the testatrix, and it should be equally clear 
that children adopted after the death of the testatrix are 
included as remaindermen. 
(9] It has been the policy of this state, at least since the 
adoption of the Civil Code, to accord to adopted children the 
same status as natural children. "A child, when adopted, 
may take the family name of the person adopting. After 
adoption, the two shall sustain towards each other the legal 
relation of parent and child, and have all the rights and be 
subject to all the duties of that relation." ( Civ. Code, § 228.) 
"The parents of an adopted child are, from the time of the 
adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all 
responsibility for, the child so adopted, and have no right 
over it." ( Civ. Code, § 229.) " 'If the adopted child is 
by virtue of its status to be ''regarded and treated in all 
respects as the child of the person adopting," and is to "have 
all the rights and be subject to all the duties of the legal 
relation of parent and child," the right to succeed to the 
estate of the deceased parent must be included.' (In re 
Newman, supra, 75 Cal. 213, 219 [16 P. 887, 7 Am.St.Rep. 
146].)" (Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 265, 268 [196 P.2d 1].) 
[10] This court has squarely held that ". . . an adopted 
child has a status with respect to its adoptive parent identical 
to that of a child born of such parent and succeeds to the 
estate of an adoptive parent in the same manner as a child 
born of such parent .... " (Estate of Pierce, supra, 32 Cal.2d 
265, 268.) [11] "The effect of an adoption is to establish 
between the adopting parents and the child the legal relation 
of parent and child, with all the legal consequences of that 
relation, including the child's right to take the family name 
of the person adopting it. This necessarily implies that the 
natural relationship between the child and its parents by 
blood is superseded. The adopting parent is substituted for 
the parent by blood, who ceases to be in a legal sense the 
parent, his place being taken by the adopting parent. In 
other words, from the time of the adoption, the parents b:v 
blood are relieved of all parental dutirs towards, and all 
responsibility for, the child adopted, and have no right over it. 
"The effect of the adoption is not limited to the period of 
the lives of the adopting parent and the adopted child; and 
the relation of parent and child, which existed between the 
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parent blood and 
revived the death of the 
of the child. 
''Adoption does not affect 
child; and a minor does not 
his adoption by an alien.'' 
§ 46. The Probate 
than at the testatrix' 
I 10 
[_ ~.:: d 
ceeds to the estate of one who has the same as 
a natural child; and the person succeeds to the 
estate of an the same as a natural An 
adopted child does not succeed to the estate of a natural parent 
when the relationship between them has been severed by the 
adoption, nor does such natural parent succeed to the estate of 
such adopted child." (Prob. Code, § 257.) The foregoing 
policy of our law is a factor in determining whether the term 
"children" includes an adopted person. It has been said that 
generally the term ''children'' might not include adopted 
children (Rest., Property, § 287; Simes and Smith, The Law 
of Future Interests (2d ed.), § 724; 144 A.L.R. 670; 70 id. 
621) but also: "Similarly, the existence of a statute which 
simultaneously includes the adopted child as an intestate taker 
from his adopting parents and excludes him as an intestate 
taker from his natural parents (see § 288, Comment b) facili-
tates a finding that the conveyor used the word 'child' with 
the intent to include thereby such an adopted person, as a 
child of his adopting parent, even though the requirements 
of neither Clause (a) nor Clause (b) are satisfied. When 
such facts concur with other constructional factors having 
the same constructional urge, the inclusion of the adopted 
child is justified." (Rest., Property, § 287, com. d.) And 
it has been held that ''children'' when used in statutes in-
cludes an adopted child. (Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506 
[271 P. 1067] ; Estate of Moore, 7 Cal.App.2d 722 [ 47 P.2d 
533, 48 P.2d 28].) In the .Mercer case it was said (p. 510): 
''The weakness of appellant's position is simply that the 
adopted daughter cannot have the full benefit of her right as 
a daughter of the deceased husband iu her relation to said 
husband unless the word 'children' in this statute of succes-
sion is held to include her. The predeceased spouse had an 
interest in, if not full ownership of, the property in question. 
Natural justice suggests that his daughter have an interest 
therein. In making his will he may have had the very con-
tingency in mind that has arisen, and decedent, too, may, 
''As another suppose decedent had willed the 
to 'my heirs' or to the 'children of my deceased 
HU>~U,~H''-',) would there be any but that such a testa-
ment would include the ? 
' included an 
146, 
P. 10]; 
In re Darling, supra Cal. 221 (159 P. 606)]). Appellant 
admits that the word 'issue' in several in said section 
does include an child. an ehild has 
been held to be a lineal descendant of the adopting parent 
of Winchester, supra: W m·ren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 
483 [30 Am.St.Rep. 370, 17 I1.R.A. 24 A. 948}). If this 
be conceded, it argu.es the nile that an adopted 
child is entitltd to any legacy the law gives to the children 
an adopting parent. 
"The whole matter is concluded the observation that the 
cases cited and the principles urged appellant furnish no 
sufficient reason for restricting the scope of the word 'children' 
in the provision under review. To exclude adopted children 
from its scope would be to say that are not entitled as 
to the adopting parent to the full rights of natural children, 
which is contrary to the express provision of the statute ( § § 
227 and 228, Civ. Code), and the terms of the decree of adop-
tion. Even the case of v. 200 Mo. 456 [118 
Am.St.Rep. 672, 9 Ann.Cas. 775, 8 r,.R.A.N.S. 117, 98 S.W. 
585], above referred to, concedes that 'the adopted child is 
so let in only for the purpose of in full its right 
of inheritance from its parent.'" (Emphasis added.) 
It is said in Dyer v. Lane, 202 . rk. 571 [151 S.W.2d 678, 680] : 
"We think a proper construction of this will means, that the 
testator, when he speaks of 'the heirs of my son, Haskell A. 
Dyer', meant the children r c TTaskrll A. Dyer. Children may 
include adopted children as ,1ell as the children of one's body. 
Deener v. Watkins, 191 Ark. 776 S.W.2d 994J. In Powell 
v. Hayes, 176 Ark 660 [3 S.W.2d 975), this court said: 
" 'In the alleged will under consideration in this case the 
testator gave the balance of his to his wife and heirs. 
as the law provides. In its strict legal sense the word "heirs" 
signifies "those upon ·whom the law casts the inheritance of 
real estate." But this construction will give way if there 
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be upon the face of the instrument sufficient to show that 
it was to be applied to children. Flint Wisconsin Trust Co., 
151 Wis. 231 [138 N.W. Ann. Cas. 1914B, page 67], and 
case note at page 70; 2 on Wills by Alexander, 
pars. 850-852, inclusive; 1 Page on Wills (2d Ed.) p. 1496, 
§ 891; and 28 R.C.L. p. 248, § 216 .... " (See, also, Kelly v. 
Kelly, 176 Ark. 548 [3 S.W.2d 305] Deener v. Watkins, 191 
Ark. 776 [87 S.W.2d .) In Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 
265, 268 [196 P.2d 1], it was held there was a showing that the 
testator did not intend to include adopted children by the 
use of the term lawful issue and that the adoption statutes 
do not require, in the face of other evidence, that such words 
include an adopted person. [12] The status of an adopted 
child should be of some significance in construing a will for 
the testator may be said to realize the possibility of adoption 
and its effect. It has been well said: " ... by investing an 
adoptee with a particular status, such as that of a 'child' of 
the adopter, the statute may have the inclusionary effect of 
tending to bring the adoptee within a designation. Thus, 
if the statute declares that the adoptee shall be deemed a 
'child' of the adopting parents as fully as though born to them 
in lawful wedlock, it is properly one of the circumstances in 
the light of which a devise to the 'children' of the adopting 
parents should be read. Where it is the sole surrounding 
circumstance of any materiality, the argument may be ad-
vanced that it supplies the conveyor's meaning .... 
"[I]t is interesting to discover that even sixty years ago 
the Supreme Court of Alabama had no difficulty in concluding 
that, absent language in the adopting statute confining the 
adoptee's rights to those of inheritance, it would have been 
the probable 'duty' of the court to hoU that an adopted 
child took under the term 'children' in a will, for the reason 
that by dictionary definition adoption is 'an act by which 
a person appoints as his heir the child of another,' and meam 
'to receive and to treat as a son or daughter one who is the 
child of another,' and 'to take into one's family as son and 
heir; to take and treat as a child, giving a title to the privileges 
and rights of a child.' To this thought, then expressed, can 
be added now the further one that by a century of develop-
ment in states with a background of common law the institu-
tion of adoption, though not indigenous to us, has becomP 
'naturalized' here and is an important and familiar adjunct 
of our society and our law. It cannot be dismissed as in-
volving the unusual. ••• 
Sept. EsTATE OF STANFORD 
[49 C.2d 120: 315 P.2d 681] 
139 
"Other in growing number, 
do not restrict the status the adoptee to that of an heir 
of the adopter or to that of a child for purposes of enumerated 
benefits only. The trend is toward making the adopted child 
a child of the to all intents and purposes. Thus, 
in including a few al-
provisions with 
to the actual effect of the adoption, the portion of 
the adoption statute relative to the making of the decree 
provides for a declaration therein that the adoptee shall be 
the child of the adopter 'to all intents and purposes,' or 
that he shall be regarded and treated 'in all respects' as the 
child of the adopter, or that the rights, duties, privileges and 
relations between the adoptee and adopters shall 'in all re-
spects' be those of a child born in lawful wedlock .... 
"Unrestricted by such an amendment, the wide language 
of the original Massachusetts statute and others like it can 
reasonably be taken to supply a prima facie meaning for 
'child,' when used in a private instrument, which woald 
include an adoptee. This is indicated by Sewall v. Roberts. 
supra [115 Mass. 262], and it is the conclusion reached or 
suggested in some other cases, both where the conveyor him-
self was the adopter and where he was not .... 
''For the purposes of the discussion it was more or less 
tacitly assumed that the adoption statute constituted one 
of the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the 
language of the instrument, and was to be considered as such. 
This was in harmony with the announced attitude of most 
courts which have taken the trouble of referring to the point 
at all. Otherwise stated, it is presumed that the instrument 
was executed in the light of knowledge of the then existing 
adoption law. A few courts only would disregard the adop-
tion statute entirely or openly belittle its position among 
the surrounding circumstances. Thrre is more common and 
proper reluctance to attach to the statute, in its relation to 
the construction of a private instrument, a presumptively 
controlling significance in the face of other circumstances 
which may be felt to be of importance al~m .... 
"No one can read the cases on this subject without soon 
becoming aware of what for the most part is an unexpressed 
but nonetheless perceptible attitude of fear on the part of 
the courts that, unless they we11 against thr institu-
tion of adoption may be an implement of self-advancement, 
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such as a 
has been some 
of a few of the cases. 
through au adoption. 
was to receive a third of the 
income from a trust for life or until he should have a child 
that should attain the age of three years, and in the latter event 
he was to receive a third of the principal, the court held that, 
having no natural he did not qualify for the corpus 
share, although he and his wife took a child of about six 
months into their household approximately a year after the 
testator died, and the child three years later. And 
there is authority that one given a fee simple estate, de-
feasible in event of his death without children or issue, could 
not by subsequent adoption acquire an absolute estate and 
avoid the executory limitation. . . . 
"If, as is the usual case, the adopter has a life estate only, 
but his children, issue or other relatives are to take the re-
mainder, with gift over to others if he die without children. 
etc., then the chances of direct personal gain to the adopter 
are not great, eveu if adopted children should qualify as 
takers within the of the will. In this situation, 
however, courts seem moved by a fear that if they should 
recognize adoptees as qualifying under the will to take the 
remainder, the life tenant adopt a child simply to 
defeat the gift over to others .... 
"The possibility of the use of adoption for avaricious or 
spiteful purposes cannot be denied. The probability of its 
employment for those ends is however, to be slight 
under modern statutes contemplating a thorough in-
vestigation into such matters as the motives of the prospective 
It should be time to speculate upon possible 
when the fraud is found. And 
in the public interest, a court 
ought not overlook any which may be manifested by the 
testatrix' 
The letter shows that Charles' 
was an infant and before 
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a letter written 
of 
of 
to take care of the child. Mr. Stanford to 
taking the child in as their own but Jennie was cared for by 
the testatrix. The testatrix said she the letter on record 
with Stanford because ''So very many unexpected 
and new phases in human nature have been brought to my 
attention, and in a way have added to my sorrows-some 
hearts have hardened towards me who should have been 
sympathetic aud tender because of my dear husband's loving 
remembrance of them and these revelations of character have 
led me into a train of thought that me to write this 
letter to you that you may fully understand the relations that 
exist between my niece Jennie L. and myself. '' And 
in closing, "I make this explicit explanation in this letter to 
you that you may hold it sacred and if ... the subject would 
be discussed whether or not Jennie L. Lathrop had been 
adopted, you can use this letter defend me. 
"I hope and pray that there will be no need to ever produce 
it, but I have learned by very sad experience the greed for 
gain tempts beyond the ability to resist. My dear brother 
Charles G. Lathrop the Father has been most kind in allow-
ing me to care and do for her as best pleased me, and he will 
never deviate from his love and loyalty to me, or my memory." 
The letter also states that Jennie and all the children of 
Mrs. Stanford's brothers, then living, had been given one 
hundred thousand dollars in her husband's will. She ex-
presses the opinion that she has won the love and devotion 
of this niece. From this letter the trial court concluded that 
Mrs. Stanford understood the meaning and effect of adoption, 
that she believed that an adopted child would have the same 
rights as a natural child, hence when she made a bequest to 
the "child or children" of her niece, Mrs. Hansen, she in-
tended to include any children that Mrs. Hansen might adopt. 
While the letter is not conelusive evidence, it, together with 
the foregoing public policy with reference to adoption and 
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considered the matter 
person adopted. 
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that the testatrix had 
and its effect upon the 
[14] There is no merit to Stanford University's claim 
that the New York was not an adoption. Mrs. 
Hansen and Mrs. and her children appeared be-
fore the New York court to the adoption and the 
court approved it. ·while there may have been some irregu-
larities in the proceeding are not of sufficient importance 
upon which to base a collateral attack. While the divorced 
husband of Mrs. Reynolds and the father of the children may 
not have been notified (the proceedings do not show whether 
or not he was) and did not consent, we fail to see how that 
will avail Stanford University here. The adoption has stood 
for many years, since 1924, without attack by anyone. 
(See, Estate of Smith, 86 Cal.App.2d 456 [195 P.2d 842].) 
[15] Stanford University has not established that the adop-
tion was void and it must be presumed to have been valid. 
(Estate of Smith, supra, 86 Cal.App.2d 456.) The effect of 
adoption under the New York law and construction of the will 
is not important. We are not here concerned with a question 
of inheritance but with the construction of a will, and whether 
''child or children'' includes adopted persons. [16] The con-
struction of the will is governed by California law (see Prob. 
Code, § 100; Rest., Conflicts, § 308). Stanford University 
suggests that the adoption was not made in good faith but 
merely for the purpose of inheritance-to bring the adopted 
persons under the will to the exclusion of Stanford University, 
the residuary legatee. This the lower court felt was not 
established and it is doubtful if it would be significant if it 
had been unless it showed the invalidity of the adoption which 
it does not. We find nothing in the will or the surrounding 
circumstances favoring Stanford University over the interpre-
tation we have given the will. 
The decree is reversed with directions to the trial court to 
order distribution of the property in accordance with the 
views herein expressed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
ASHBURN, J. protem.,* Dissenting.-Unable to concur in 
the prevailing opinion, I feel impelled to express my views 
upon the proper approach to this case and its ultimate dis-
position. 
*Assigned by Chairman of J udicia.l Council 
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..-n,• • ..-rm-.. years after the execution of the last testament of 
Jane Lathrop Stanford it becomes the province of this court 
to construe one of that will, which creates a trust for 
the benefit of testatrix' L. during her 
lifetime, with remainder to ''the child or children of said Amy 
L. Hansen." The rise to this litigation is 
phrased as follows: 'c. To pay over at regular intervals to 
my niece, the said IL the full one-third of the 
net income from said one million dollars, being one-
half of said trust fund, for and the term of her natural 
life, and upon her death this trust shall cease and determine 
as to one-third of said one million dollars and the said one-
third of said one million dollars shall belong to and be deliv-
ered to the child or children of said Amy L. Hansen." 
The will is dated July 28, 1903; Mrs. Stanford died on 
February 28, 1905. Her niece, Amy L. Hansen, was 37 years 
of age when the will was made; she had one son, Walter L. 
Hansen, who was then 13 years old; he died on October 21, 
1918, without issue, at the age of 28, leaving all his estate 
by will to Mrs. Ruth Barton, who was not a relative of Mrs. 
Stanford but a total stranger to her. His mother, Amy L. 
Hansen, survived him. Some 19 years after the death of 
Mrs. Stanford, on February 23, 1924, Mrs. Hansen adopted 
under the laws of New York her own niece, Aimee G. Reynolds, 
an adult, and Aimee's two minor children now named Minnie 
Devereaux Bond Rochester and Aimee Christine Muniz. These 
children had not been born at the time of Mrs. Stanford's 
death and she had had no information about any such pros-
pective adoption and no reason to anticipate it as a probable 
future event. 
Mrs. Hansen having died without issue of her body then sur-
viving, the trust terminated on August 4, 1954. Mrs. Barton, 
as legatee and distributee of the entire estate of Walter L. 
Hansen, claimed the Stanford trust estate upon the theory 
that it vested in Walter upon the death of Mrs. Stanford and 
passed to claimant through his will; also that the word 
"children" in the quoted paragraph of Mrs. Stanford's will 
did not include any adopted children of Mrs. Hansen. Those 
adoptees assert ownership of the trust remainder upon the 
theory that Walter's interest was contingent upon his surviv-
ing his mother and ceased upon his death prior to her demise; 
that the word "ch:Jdren" included those adopted by Mrs. 
Hansen and hence they were entitled to the remainder. As 
residuary legatee named in the will, The Board of Trustees 
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the trust estate. The trial court, 
the claims of the adoptees 
and ordered distribution of the trust estate 
in equal shares to Aimee G. Reynolds, Minnie 
Devereaux Bond Rochester and Aimee Christine Muniz. The 
University and Mrs. Barton separately, each assert-
ing title to the trust estate to the exclusion of all other 
claimants. 
All authorities agree that the paramount desideratum in 
the construction of a will is the ascertainment of the testator's 
intention as therein through words or fair impli-
cation. "It is generally that a testamentary instru-
ment is to be examined with a view to discovering the dece-
dent's testamentary schc·me or general intention, and that 
the apparent meaning of particular words, phrases and pro-
visions is to be subordinated to this scheme, plan or dominant 
purpose. The technical of words should not prevail 
over the obvious intent of the testator." (Estate of Puett, 
I Cal.2d 131, 133 P.2d .) 
It is contended appellant Barton that there was error 
in receiving parol evidence over objection because the will is 
unambiguous upon its face. It is a mistaken notion that a 
·will can be interpreted without reference to the property or 
the persons upon which it or the circumstances in 
which it was made. Paley v. Superior Court, 137 CaL 
App.2d 450, 455-456 [290 P.2d .) When the language of 
the document before us is to its factual setting, an 
ambiguity arises. the most recent definition of ambiguity 
in Beneficial etc. Ins. Co. Knrt Hitke d1 Oo., 46 Cal.2d 517, 
524-525 [297 P.2d .) Such an uncertainty, whether 
deemed latent or removable by resort to extrinsic 
evidence. (Paley v. sttpra, at page 457; Estate 
of Sargwva.k. 41 CaL2d 319 [259 P.2d 897] ; Estate of 
Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 273-274 [196 P.2d 1].) When the 
1Hereinafter designated as University. 
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words "child or children" are applied to the facts at bar a 
substantial ambiguity arises, first, as to whether a child who 
was living at testatrix' death must survive the life tenant in 
order to take full title or on the other hand immediately ac-
quires an equitable fee which he may pass by assignment or 
u,o,vvO>.LLJlu.u; secondly, whether those words em-
the life tenant many years after 
testatrix' death. There was no error in receiving the ex-
trinsic evidence at bar. True, it did not go to testatrix' in-
tent concerning the legal concept of vesting (the point made 
by Mrs. Barton's counsel), but it did reflect direct light upon 
her intention as to who should have her property and when 
and on what conditions. Indeed, in the absence of the use 
of technical terms in their strict sense, testatrix' intention as 
to the legal effect of what she had provided in the will can-
not control. That is governed by substantive law. (See 
57 Am.Jur. § 1134, p. 729.) 
Our search for the intention of Mrs. Stanford as expressed 
through her "testamentary scheme or general intention," the 
"scheme, plan or dominant purpose" found within the four 
corners of the document, requires a close inspection of the 
will within its matrix. First we must examine the document 
itself. In this instance the terms of the trust as set forth in the 
will are quoted verbatim in the decree of partial distribu-
tion which evidences the trust; "upon the trusts provided for 
by the said last will of Jane L. Stanford, deceased, said trusts 
being expressed in said will as follows, namely." In such 
situations an interpretation of the decree depends upon the 
construction of the will itself. ( lr1 anning v. Bank of Cali-
fornia, 216 Cal. 629, 637-638 [15 P.2d 746]; Canfield v. 
Security-First Nat. Bank, 13 Cal.2d 1, 18-19 [87 P.2d 830]; 
Estate of Ryan, 96 Cal.App.2d 787, 791-792 [216 P.2d 497].) 
When executing the will Mrs. Stanford had two living 
brothers. To one of them, Charles Gardner Lathrop, she gave 
a million dollars outright. For the benefit of the other one, 
Ariel Lathrop, and the descendants of a deceased brother 
Daniel Shields Lathrop she created a trust of two million 
dollars. 'l'he income from one-half thereof was to be paid to 
Ariel during his lifetime, '' :ud upon his death (as he has no 
children or descendants), this trust shall cease and determine 
as to one-half of said trust property" and same "shall belong 
to and be delivered to his relatives," i.e., one-half to brother 
Charles and one-half to descendants of deceased brother 
Daniel, in the following shares, viz., one-third to his daughter 
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Jennie L. Lawton, one-third to his daughter Amy Gardner 
Hansen, and the other one-third in equal shares to Daniel 
S. Gunning and Amy L. grandchildren of said de-
ceased brother Daniel and children of his deceased daughter 
Christine L. Ariel's half of the original trust was 
not to remain in trust, but the other half, one million dollars, 
was to be held the trustee for the benefit of the same rela-
tives and in the same as just outlined. Paragraph 
c of section I, above defines the trust for Amy L. 
Hansen. Jennie h Lawton, the other niece, had one child 
then living and the trust for her benefit was couched in exactly 
the same terms as the one created for Mrs. Hansen and her 
child or children. The for the benefit of the Gun-
nings ( d of I) is set forth in the margin. 2 A bequest of 
$15,000 was made to Miss Bertha Berner, who had been 
"Secretary and devoted friend" for nineteen years; five ser-
vants were left $1,000 each; charitable gifts of $5,000 and 
$10,000 were made to fourteen eleemosynary institutions, an 
aggregate of $105,000. Paragraph XIX contains this: "Since 
executing former wills, a Kind Providence has brought about 
more favorable conditions in the affairs of the Estate left me 
by my beloved husband, and for this reason I have greatly 
enlarged my gifts to the lJeland Stanford Junior University, 
and I now feel justified in enlarging, as I have done in this 
Will, my bequests to my relatives and friends and different 
charities, which have been ever dear to my heart." Para-
.. 'To pay over, one-half to each, at regular intervals, to said Daniel 
B. Gunning and Amy L. Gunning, the children of my deceased niece 
Christine L. Gunning, one-third of the net income arising from said onp 
million dollars, the said one-half of said trust property, until such time as 
the younger of the two shall reach the age of twenty-five years, at which 
time this trust shall cease and determine as to one-third of said one 
million dollars the one-half of said trust property, and the said one-third 
shall belong to and be delivered to said Daniel S. and Amy L. Gunning. 
absolutely and in their own right, share and share alike, and free from 
all trusts; provided. however, that if either should die before the 
younger attains the age of twenty-five years, this trust shall cease and 
determine as to one-half of said one-third of a million dollars and that 
proportion of the trust property shall belong to and be delivered to the 
children of the one so dying, or, if there be no Ruch children, then to the 
other; and the trust shall thereafter continue as to the other one-half of 
said one-third of a million dollars until the survivor reaches the age of 
twenty-five years, at which time the trust as to the remainder of said 
one-third of a million dollars shall cease and determine and the property 
shall belong to and be delivered to said survivor, but if such survivor 
dies before attaining such age of twenty-five years this trust shall then 
cease and determine and the trust property shall belong to and be 
delivered to his or her children, or if there be none such, then to his or 
her heirs at law." 
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graph XXI states that testatrix' silver dinner 
service, certain " of from 
and other silver, are 
Trustees,'' and adds: '' 
curios, china of rare 
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vases, clocks, statues of al1 mosaics 
of all kinds, marble to the Trustees from 
my home at Palo Alto Farm and San Francisco also included 
and to be placed in tl1e Museum as aforesaid named, and I 
hereby confirm the of the articles mentioned in this 
Paragraph." The residue of the estate is left to the Uni-
versity in these words: "All the residue and remainder 
of my property and estate, of every kind and nature and 
wheresoever situated, not hereinbefore disposed of, I give, 
devise and bequeath to the Board of Trustees of the Leland 
Stanford Junior University as founded and endowed by my 
husband and myself by our joint grant of November eleventh, 
1885, recorded in the County of Santa Clara, in Liber 83 of 
Deeds, at page 23 et seq., and confirmed by grants dated 
December 9th, 1901, to have and to hold to the said Trustees 
and to their successors forever as an integral part of the 
endowment of the said University, ... " Then follow requests 
that the University trustees preserve certain articles in the 
museum, certain ones in the library building, and others in 
the memorial room of her husband in the museum building. 
Paragraph XXV is the disinheritance provision. It starts 
with these words: ''Of the large Estate committed to the 
hands of my husband and myself, I have made what I con-
sider the wisest and most just disposition, and the disposition 
most in accordance with the cherished wishes long entertained 
by my husband and myself, and I shall greatly deplore any 
attempt to disturb it;" then it reduces to $100 the share of 
any successful or unsuccessful contestant, heir or legatee, and 
directs that the balance of such share "that would otherwise 
have gone to such person or persons by devise or inheritance 
shall pass under the residuary clause of the said Will." 
The will, when applied to facts presumptively within the 
knowledge of testatrix, indicates that it was not made solely 
for the benefit of relatives. The appraised value of the estate 
was $3,391,871.32. Three million dollars were left to the 
relatives, $125,000 to employees and charities. Under the de-
cree of :final distribution the University as residuary legatee 
received $26,003.60 in cash, 200 Northern Pacific Railway 
Company bonds having face value of $200,000 (25 of such 
bonds were and other bonds 
$1,500 face value; a total of about $227,500; the exact 
does not appear in the record. It is significant that 
the contest clause of the will that the share of one 
who attempts to defeat its in any respect shall be 
reduced to $100 and the balance thereof shall go to the 
rather than other relatives who have not 
to frustrate the testatrix' for division of her 
On Mrs. Stanford made a holographic 
which disposed of items of jewelry that 
have been divided among the nieces and great-
nieces, but it mentioned no one other than the University. Her 
executors were instructed to sell her private car "Stanford," 
certain enumerated valuable jewels and all other jewels not 
previously given to the University, and to turn over the pro-
ceeds to the trustees of the University "to be held and used 
by the said Trustees for said University upon the trusts re-
ferred to in the foregoing Will." This later writing plainly 
discloses that the will of 1903 had not exhausted Mrs. Stan-
ford's desire to benefit the University and that the phrase of 
the will, ''I now feel justified in enlarging, as I have done 
in this Will, my bequests to my relatives and friends and 
different charities,'' did not imply an intent to do so at the 
expense of the University except to the extent therein specifi-
cally stated. 
Significant and outstanding facts about this will and its 
codicil are concern for blood relatives and for the University 
which testatrix and her husband had founded. Aside from 
said employees and specified charitable institutions there is no 
word indicative of a desire to share her fortune with strangers 
to the blood. There is nothing to suggest a desire to benefit 
adopted children of any of the named relatives, nothing to 
show that the subject matter was in her mind at all. 
The extrinsic evidence is illuminative upon the dominant 
purpose and scheme of the will-to provide for the University 
and testatrix' own close relatives. 
Her relations with her kindred were not close but were 
affectionate; they seem to be included in that sense in the 
phrase of the will, "my bequests to my relatives and friends 
and different charities, which have been ever dear to my 
heart.'' 
As stated in the will, testatrix and her husband had founded 
and endowed the university in 1885, naming it for their only 
son who had previously died. In an address to the trustees 
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of the which she made less than a year before 
executing the instant will Mrs. Stanford described the basic 
purpose of the original endowment and later gifts, saying: 
"The moving of the Founders in the foundation and 
endowment of the Leland Stanford Junior University was love 
of humanity and a desire to render the greatest possible ser-
vice to mankind. The was accordingly designed 
for the betterment of mankind morally, spiritually, intellec-
tually, physically and materially. The public at large, and 
not alone the comparatively few students who can attend the 
University, are the chief and ultimate beneficiaries of the 
foundation.'' 
Thus inspired, this deeply religious woman who acknowl-
edged her gratitude to God in her last will,3 undertook the 
burden which her husband had laid down during or just 
before the panic and depression of 1893. He had left $2,500,-
000 to the university but the closing of his estate was de-
layed and the money not received until 1898, after the most 
crucial needs of that institution had been supplied by the 
widow. The estate was involved in litigation with the United 
States government and closing was thus delayed. Mrs. Stan-
ford had only the family allowance of $10,000 awarded her 
by the probate court. She had to close down ''a great vine-
yard in Tehama County" known as the Vina ranch, sold 
many fine horses, closed her city home, dismissed all servants 
except Ah Wing (who was her servant for 20 years before 
the will was made). To obtain action upon the government 
lawsuit she journeyed to Washington and laid that case and 
the exigencies of the University before President Cleveland. 
who forthwith expedited the hearing of the lawsuit for her. 
She wrote him a letter expressing her gratitude, which con-
tained the following look at the future: "Since my visit to 
Washington I have decided to keep the doors open of the Uni-
versity another year hopeing and trusting in an all Wise God 
that it will go on as long as the State of California exists." 
'ro Governor Budd she described her action and her motives 
in a letter which says: "I felt it a sacred duty to my husband, 
my son, and the blessed work to lay before the President and 
the Attorney General the desperate struggle I had made to 
3
'' I wish thus publicly to acknowledge my great gratitude to an all· 
wise, loving Heavenly Father for His sustaining grace through the past 
ten years of bereavements, trial and disappointments. In all I have leaned 
hard on this Great Comforter and found rest and peace. I have no doubt 
about a future life beyond this; a fair land where no more tears will 
be shed and no more partings had." 
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Father's in my 
disheartened until I learned the Government 
years. Under such adverse cir-
cumstances I was unable reengage the President and faculty 
for another year, for I have no fortune and I had, 
as far as all my expenses, sold all 
I and Courts allowed me, for its mainte-
nance the This has cost me a struggle far 
beyond the world's and to fail now meant giving 
up all I live for." In a letter of 1896 she described the Uni-
versity as ''the Institution which was so dear to the heart of 
my husband and dearer still to me because of the great bur-
dens which I have had to carry in order to insure its exist-
ence." During one period she gave regularly to the Uni-
versity $10,000 a month but its expenses wer0 $19,000 and 
she managed somehow to supply the other $9,000. In 1897 she 
gave her home and contents to the University, subject to a re-
served life estate. In June of that year she donated to it 
bonds having face value of $900,000. These latter gifts were 
made contrary to her attorney's advice and she wrote to 
President David Starr ,Jordan in August, 1897, saying: "I am 
only anxious to furnish you with funds to pay the needs re-
quired. I could live on bread and water to do this my part, 
and would feel that God and my beloved ones in the life be-
yond this, smiled on effort;;: made to ensure the future of my 
dear husband's work to better humanity." In December, 
1898, she wrote Dr. ,Jordan again, saying: "You know dear 
trusted friend that every dollar I can rightfully call mine is 
sacredly laid on the Alter of my love the University, and 
thus it will ever be.'' 
In May, 1899. coincident with large gifts of land to the 
University she made an address to the trustees containing 
these words: ''Being of sound and disposing mind and 
memory, and mindful of the uncertainty of life, I deem it 
to be my sacred duty to so put my house in order that when 
I am called hence from mortal life, I can feel that I have done 
all that I could to further advance and insure the future 
of the great work which was so sacredly left to my care." 
At about that same time an instrument of gift to the uni-
versity carried this : "Of tlw large Estate com-
mitted to the keeping of my husband and myself, I have 
made what I consider the wisest and most just disposition, 
and the disposition most in accordance with cherished wishes 
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long entertained my husband and myself." The opening 
expression of paragraph XXV of the will of 1903 is in almost 
identical language. In July, 1900, Mrs. Stanford gave the 
University certain bonds having face value of $12,426,000. 
Just as courts consider oral evidence of affection for the 
natural objects of a testator's bounty, or lack of such affec-
tion, in determining the intent of language used in 
his will, so it is proper to eonsider here this background 
of affectionate concern of testatrix for the University which 
to her stood as a monument to her deceased husband and her 
only son and as an outlet for her own desire to serve her 
God and humanity. It has a direct bearing upon the general 
scheme and plan of her will. This evidence and the inferences 
deducible from it stand uncontradicted and it cannot be said 
fairly that this will bears any connotation of a desire to 
benefit any stranger (except the designated servants and 
charities), or any adoptee whose artificial status Mrs. Stan-
ford had no occasion to anticipate. Subject to the specified 
exceptions (servants and charities) the scheme of this will is 
provision for blood relatives and for testatrix' beloved uni-
versity. An actual intention to provide for persons such as 
a legatee of Walter Hansen, or an adoptee of Mrs. Hansen, 
cannot be read into this will which, to say the least, is abso-
lutely silent on these subjects. How then does the matter 
stand as one of substantive law? Is there some construction 
which the law imposes upon the testatrix' expression of in-
tent nolens volens T 
It cannot be denied that this gift to Mrs. Hansen for life 
with remainder to her "child or children" is a class gift. 
"As to a gift to a class the ru1e is stated as follows: 'In legal 
contemplation a gift to a class is a gift of an aggregate sum 
to a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the 
gift, to be ascertained at a future time, who are all to take in 
equal or some other definite proportions, the share of each 
being dependent for its amount upon the ultimate number.' " 
(Estate of Mwrphy, 157 Cal. 63, 67 [106 P. 230, 137 Am.St. 
Rep. 110].) The Restatement of the Law of Property, § 279, 
comment a, at page 1453, says: "The intention of the conveyor 
that there be the possibility of fluctuation in the number of 
takers is the factor which differentiates a class gift from a 
gift to individuals singly.'' Nor is there any dissent among 
the authorities from the proposition that a class gift auto-
matically opens to receive and benefit new members, e.g., a 
child of a life tenant born after the testatrix' demise. But 
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of whether the death a class member before 
time for distribution terminates his interest and thus enlarges 
those of the survivors there is a of judicial ex-
Enlargement of the class and shrinking of its 
present two different questions. 
Subsection 2 of section 296 of the Restatement 
says: ''Prom the fact that a class can increase in "'"·''"'v~· 
until a certain future no inference should be made that 
such members of the class as survive to such future date 
become distributees." The first rule (opening for new mem-
bers) is settled as a matter of law. But the 
effect of a decrease in membership of a class has not crystal-
lized into an inflexible rule of substantive law. "\Vhether a 
remainder vests in designated persons in their individual 
right, or whether it passes to members of a class taking as a 
group which is to be fixed and determined in the future, 
is a matter of testamentary intention which must be ascer-
tained from the text of the whole will viewed in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances. . . . There is no judicially 
approved formula either of text or attending circumstances 
that will in every case solve the problem; each will must be 
construed upon its own particular language and against its 
peculiar background." (In re Cameron's Estate (Surr.Ct. 
N.Y.), 66 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764.) In the present state of the 
authorities the effect of a decrease in class membership pre-
sents primarily a question of the testator's intent that sur-
vivorship be a condition precedent or subsequent to one's 
beneficial enjoyment as a class member. 
Discussion of the problem in terms of contingent or vested 
remainder is not conducive to enlightenment. Mr. Justice 
Cardozo, in New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 
237 N.Y. 93 [142 N.E. 431, 432, 41 A.L.R. 791], said: "When 
we speak in this connection of the vesting of an interest, 
we mean, of course, a vesting that is absolute and finaL The 
statutory definition of vested and contingent estates sheds 
little light upon the problem, for an estate may be vested 
within the definition of the statute, though defeasible by death 
before the moment of division. [Citations.] The only signifi-
cant distinction for the purpose now in view is between an 
estate that is absolute and one subject to conditions." Gray 
on The Rule Against Perpetuities, Second Edition, section 
llOa, page 83, says: ''The placing this class of remainders 
under the head of vested remainders is to some extent arti-
ficial," and in section 205a, at page 171 : "Though the interest 
is called vested, it is in truth contingent." 
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Section 296 the at page says: '(1) 
A ' taker' under the terms of a limitation in favor of 
class described ' . . . of a person is 
a distributee of the subject matter of 
such class he fails to survive to the time to 
he survive the terms of the limita-
" At page 1609 "When the matter of the class 
"'""'"','"'t" sum. the exclusion of a ' taker' 
of one of the rules stated in the Clauses of 
Subseetion (1) increases the share of each distributee under 
such limitation not thus excluded T11nstrations 1 and 6). 
Herein lies one of the importances of construing the 
limitation to be in favor of a class rather than in favor of 
individuals Introductory Note to this Chapter, 
third paragraph)." At page 1611. comment f: "It is im-
material under the rule stated in Clause (b) of Subsection 
) whether this requirement of survival is imposed as a 
condition precedent of the interest created or as a defeasibility 
thereof operative upon the failure of such person to survive. •• 
Simes & Smith, on the Law of Putnre Interests (2d ed.), 
section 640, page 78: "Where a gift to a class is postponed, 
far as distribution is concerned, until the termination of 
a prior life estate, it is clear that the general rule of con-
struction would permit the class to increase until the end of 
the life estate, but would exclude all members of the class who 
were not in being at the termination of the life estate. Such, 
in fact, is the common result, with reference to gifts of both 
personalty and realty. Such an application gives effect to the 
probable desire of the transferor to include as many members 
as possible and to the principle of convenience in closing the 
class when the time has come for distribution." Section 652, 
page 103: " ... Phrased in another way, the question is 
whether there is any requirement of survival to a particular 
point of time. In many of the cases, the question is frequently 
discussed in terms of whether the gift is vested or contingent 
-it being assumed by the court that if the gift is vested there 
is no requirement of survival. and that if it is contingent 
there is a requirement of survival. We have already seen, 
however, that analysis in such terms tends to obscure the real 
issue, since it is possible for a vestrd interest to be subject 
to a requirement of survival in the form of a condition sub-
sequent, and it is also possible to have a contingent interest 
which is transmissible and which does not terminate with the 
death of the owner thereof." 
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It is also important in considering this subject to differ-
entiate those cases which deal with gifts to a class consisting 
of testator's own children or grandchildren and those in favor 
of a class composed of the children of some other person, such 
as a collateral relative, which is the instant case. Equally 
important is the differentiation of those cases dealing with 
a class which has not been exhausted as to membership. The 
cases dealing with these two categories often arrive at a 
conclusion of indefeasible vesting, this on the basis of a 
presumed or inferred intention of the testator. In consider-
ing the claims of Mrs. Barton, apart from those of respondent 
adoptees, we deal with a class whose membership had been 
exhausted prior to the time for distribution. We shall for 
the present discuss this aspect of the case. 
Mrs. Stanford's will plainly shows that she wanted the 
University to have anything that would not pass to the per-
sons and in the manner specified in that instrument; this 
through the gift of the residue and the disinheritance clause 
above quoted. If a condition of survivorship of Walter L. 
Hansen was essential to that end then such survivorship was 
an implied term of the will. To infer that testatrix intended 
Walter to be able to substitute some stranger as the recipient 
of a third of a million dollars of her property is to my mind 
too legalistic.4 There is not a scintilla of evidence that Mrs. 
Stanford actually intended any stranger to take any part 
of the Hansen trust through any device or in any circum-
stances whatever. 
The suggestion that Mrs. Stanford probably foresaw the 
possibility that Walter Hansen would predecease his mother 
leaving issue surviving him, that she would not want to cut 
such issue off or treat them differently from the issue of her 
niece Christine L. Gunning, that therefore there was no im-
plied condition of survivorship attached to the gift to Walter 
Hansen. does not find support in the will or any other evi-
dence. Subdivision d of I of the will, which immediately 
follows the Amy L. Hansen trust, deals with the descendants 
• All presumptions and constructional preference rules must yield to 
ascertained intention of the testatrix. "The paramount rule in the 
construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will 
is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed 
therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible. (Civ. 
Code,~~ 1317, 1318.) Statutory rules of interpretation are to be followed 
insofar as they aid in determining the intention of the testator, but they 
are all subject to the fundamental rule that the intention 1M shown by the 
will must prevail." (Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63, 66-67 (193 P. 581].) 
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of the deceased niece Christine L. Gunning; it plainly con-
templates death of a grandniece or grandnephew without sur-
viving issue for it says so,-"or, if there be no such children, 
then to the other" and "shall belong to and be delivered to 
his or her children, or if there be none such, then to his or 
her heirs at law." If, as asserted, Mrs. Stanford had in mind 
the possibility of Walter's demise leaving issue, her failure 
to mention that event in the preceding paragraph c is highly 
significant as a showing of deliberation in refraining from any 
further disposition than one ''to the child or children of said 
Amy L. Hansen." Moreover, the intention which courts must 
seek in construing a decedent's will is intent with respect 
to the facts to which it must be applied, intent with respect 
to things that have happened, not those that never occurred. 
If the interest of Walter L. Hansen in the trust be viewed 
as contingent, subject to condition precedent that he survive 
distribution, it lapsed upon his death (Estate of Easter, 24 
Cal.2d 191 [148 P.2d 601]), and fell into the residue. If it 
be viewed as a vested interest it was vested subject to de-
feasance. All vested class interests are subject to partial 
defeasance upon entrance of a new member into the class 
and are subject to complete defeasance where the class mem-
bership is exhausted and testator's intention that the gift 
shall thereupon fall into the residue is fairly apparent. 
For convenience the rule of section 296 of the Restatement 
is again quoted : " ( 1) A 'possible taker' under the terms 
of a limitation in favor of a class described as 'children,' ... 
of a designated person is excluded from being a distributee 
of the subject matter of such class gift if . . . (b) he fails to 
survive to the time to which he is required to survive by the 
terms of the limitation. " 5 This has been recognized in this 
state as sound doctrine. The latest pronouncement on the 
subject which was in existence at the time of Mrs. Stanford's 
making her will was that of Estate of Cavarly, 119 Cal. 406, 
410 [51 P. 629] : "It is the rule that when a testamentary 
disposition is made to a class, and possession is postponed, it 
includes all persons within the class at the time to which pos. 
"The Restatement amplifies this at page 1610 by this illustration: "1. 
A has a son B who has children C and D. A, owning Blackacre in fee 
simple absolute, executes an otherwise effective will devising Blackacre 
'to B for life and thereafter to the children of B in fee simple absolute.' 
C dies. A dies and his will is duly probated. C is excluded from being 
a distributee of Blackacre. B dies. In the absence of an applicable laps<• 
statute (see § 298) D acquires an estate in fee simple absolute in the 
whole of Blaekacre.'' 
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a class that 
who are in existence at the time of the distribution. 
on Perpetuities, sec. 698.) ''6 
C.2d 
Estate of Clark, 64 636 P.2d 465] (hearing 
denied), dealt with a trust for the benefit of Walter C. 
a of same to go upon his death to his "sur-
viving lawful issue.'' Miller died three children; one 
of Miller died later two 
adopted children but no issue of her body. Held that the 
adopted children could not take and that the other children 
of Walter C. Miller would take to the exclusion of Mrs. 
Dorstewitz' heirs because she did not have a vested, inde-
feasable estate. The opinion says, at page 641 : "A gift to a 
class is a gift of an aggregate sum to a body of persons un-
certain in number to be ascertained at a future time, all 
to take in some definite proportions, the amount of the share 
of each being dependent upon the ultimate number of the 
class. ( 6 Jarman on Wills, § 232; Rest., Law of Property, 
p. 1451.) When members of a class pass on, the surviving 
members take to the exclusion of the devisees or heirs at law 
of such deceased member. (3 Page on Wills, Lifetime ed., 
§ 1058.) Thereby, the share of a deceased member increases 
the share of the survivors of the group. (In re Wood's 
Estate, 321 Pa. 497 [184 A. 13].)" And at page 642: "The 
class is to be ascertained when the duty arises to convey and 
deliver, and survivorship at that time is one of the condi-
tions of the gift .... A gift to 'surviving lawful issue' is not 
to individuals named but to a class of designated persons 
the members of which are to be ascertained either at the death 
of the specified beneficiary or at the time of distribution." 
Essentially, In re Winter, 114 Cal. 186, 190 [45 P. 1063], 
and Estate of Hartson, 218 Cal. 536, 539-541 [24 P.2d 171], 
stand for the principles voiced in the Clark case, supra. 
Perusal of them will disclose that emphasis is laid upon the 
intention of the testator in each instance. While the language 
of California decisions which are said to be to the contrary is 
not wholly reconcilable with these cases, the quest for in-
tention of a testator is a common thread which pervades all 
of them and in a broad sense makes them harmonious. Estate 
of Blake, 157 Cal. 448, 458 [108 P. 287]: "There is no subject 
•n is immaterial that the citation of § 698 of Gray on Perpetuities may 
not support the statement for which it is cited. The text announced the 
law of this state. 
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in the law to which more refinement of learning has been 
particularly in ascertaining whether 
a remainder is a or vested one, more nice, technical, 
rules of construction have been formulated .... 
are subordinate rules of construction which are 
only in the absence of all other indications in the 
will to the and in support of au intention on the 
of the testator to crt>ate a vested remainder." This rule 
of the Clark and similar cases, if accepted as one of construc-
tional preference in aid of effcetuating the testator's intent, 
is undoubtedly sound law. It would be a futile task to at-
tempt to reconcile all our California decisions upon the sub-
ject, but referenee win be made to several which are said 
to be opposed to the cases above discussed. 
Estate of Backesto, 71 Cal.App. 409 [235 P. 670]. Testa-
tor left his wife a life estate in all his property and directed 
that upon her death the property be sold and the proceeds 
divided equally among children of certain of his brothers 
and sisters-all except his brother Henry's children who 
should take half as much as the others. Testator's brother 
Jacob had a daughter, Irene Seton, who died before testa-
tor's wife. Irene's daughter, Sadie Seton Wagner, was ex-
cluded from the distribution made by the trial court and 
she appealed. The ruling was made upon the theory that the 
gifts did not vest until the death of testator's wife. The 
appellate court held that a class gift vests at the testator's 
death and opens as ne1v 1:1embers eome into being though 
possession is postponed. It assumed this vesting to be de-
terminative of the case and on that basis reversed the judg-
ment; it did not discuss the matter of a defeasance of a 
vested interest or any implication of survivorship. For these 
reasons it cannot be ("ciiSidered as controlling at bar. 
Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152 [177 P.2d 299]. Testa-
trix had one son, Frederic King, whose wife was Edith Bos.-
well King. They had three children, Boswell F. King, Thomas 
S. King and William N. King. William died before either 
of his parents, leaving his wife Margaret W. King surviving 
him. Testatrix' will set up certain trusts which were to 
terminate upon the death of both Frederic and his wife Edith. 
'rhereupon, the trustee was to "grant and deliver" the trust 
estate, share and share alike, to the children of Frederic and 
Edith "or their legal heirs by right of representation," i.e., 
the legal heirs of said children. The will also provided that 
any other child born to Frederic and Edith should share in 
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the trust with the same rights as children previously named. 
The decree of distribution departed somewhat from this 
language (see p. 157), providing for delivery of the trust 
property ''unto the children, share and share alike, or their 
legal heirs by right of representation, of the said" Frederic 
and Edith. Appellants Boswell F. King and Thomas S. King 
claimed the entire trust estate on the theory that William N. 
King's death before termination of the trust ended his in-
terest therein; that survivorship was of the essence of the 
class gift because the remainders were contingent and not 
vested (p. 157). Respondent contended that the interests 
were vested and only possession was postponed. The review-
ing court held that the remainders were vested and the fact 
that the class would open for new members was not incon-
sistent with that conclusion. The question presented in the 
instant case was not considered in Norris. Indeed, the terms 
of the will provided for deceased class members by directing 
that their shares should go to their legal heirs. The court 
said, at page 160: ''If the decree is fairly clear without resort 
to rules of constructional preference then, of course, such 
rules need not be considered. Many times these rules of con-
struction are resorted to as a form of rationalization, that is, 
to justify a construction already made.'' At page 161 : ''The 
law is well settled that vested remainders can be created in 
a class the membership of which is not complete at the effec-
tive date of the grant or devise, so that similar vested in-
terests accrue to those who, by later entry therein, fall within 
the class. . . . In such a case the remainders could well be 
vested in the three children of Frederic and Edith, and, had 
there been any later entrants into the class (there were not), 
their interests would have vested as they were born, and by 
virtue of the consequent increase in the class membership, 
the vested interests of the preceding members would have 
been proportionately diminished. It is well settled that the 
fact that the interests of existing members of the class may be 
thus diminished does not convert the interest of such mem-
bers to contingent remainders. In such event the remainders 
are vested subject to a condition subsequent." The author 
of the Norris opinion referred to it in Leonardini v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, 131 Cal.App.2d 9, 15 [280 P.2d 81, 49 A.L.R.2d 
1085], as follows: "The parties seem agreed that the interest 
of appellant was vested, and base that conclusion on Estate 
of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152 [177 P.2d 299]. Undoubtedly 
this court held in that case that a decree of distribution 
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which provided that a gift, after a life estate, to the children 
'or their legal heirs by right of representation,' created a 
vested remainder in the children. The quoted phrase is, of 
course, equivalent to 'or his heirs' found in the present case. 
But the court did not hold that in every case the quoted 
phrase made the remainder a vested one, but held that under 
all the provisions of the decree of distribution, discussed at 
length in the opinion, an intent appeared to make the re-
mainder vested. The cases ori this subject are in hopeless 
conflict and seldom, if ever, turn solely upon the words 'or 
his heirs' or their equivalent. The great majority of them 
turn upon all of the provisions of the trust, the courts trying 
to ascertain the intent of the testator. (See anno. 128 A.L.R. 
306.)" 
Whether a class member's survival of the life tenant is a 
condition subsequent upon nonoccurrence of which a vested 
interest is terminated is not answered by a mere holding that 
that future estate is vested, but turns upon the intention of 
the testatrix. In this case it appears to be the sound conclusion 
that survival of the life tenant is a condition subsequent at-
tached to the estate vested in a class member; a total failure of 
class members to survive the life tenant causes the gift to lapse 
and fall into the residue. To hold that Walter Hansen had 
an estate which could be alienated and which would survive 
the life tenant after his own death opens the way for in-
jecting into the class strangers to the blood, people whom the 
testatrix had no possible intention of benefiting. There is no 
evidence of substantiality tending to establish an affirmative 
or any intention of testatrix that anyone other than Walter 
L. Hansen or the University should enjoy the benefit of the 
remainder of the Hansen trust. 
The trial court properly held that Walter L. Hansen had 
no estate which he could will to Mrs. Barton, and that his 
interest in the trust lapsed upon his death. That the ruling 
may have been based upon the faulty view that Walter had 
only a contingent estate, in the sense of one subject to a con-
dition precedent, does not affect the soundness of the de-
cision. 
Appellant Barton contends that the determination of this 
law question has been concluded by the ruling in an early 
proceeding to which the University was a party. As above 
shown, testatrix created a trust for her niece, Jennie L. Law-
ton, in the same language as that used in the case of Amy L. 
Hansen. Mrs. Lawton had one son who survived testatrix 
C.2d 
but died without issue mother. 
She died thereafter and her executor for 
distribution to her of the son's interest in the Stan-
ford trust estate. contested but the court 
made the order as 1927. The Uni-
versity to this court. was dis-
missed to claim cannot be 
sustained for several reasons. 
There was no of res in the trial court and 
the case was not tried upon the theory of the existence of such 
an issue. Counsel's argument here is based upon Southern 
Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Ca1.2d 545, 548 [55 P.2d 
847], a case which does not consider res judicata. Indeed, 
counsel's contention is that conflicting decisions with respect 
to the two trusts "creates an anomalous situation in a cw1e 
wherein diametrically opposite conclusions are reached as to 
the legal effect of the same essential facts, similarly presented, 
but applied to different individuals." The cited case was one 
of two lawsuits which this court brought together for con-
temporaneous disposition in order to avoid divergent results 
flowing from identical facts and law questions. That prece-
dent was strictly limited in Dillard v. McKnight, 34 Cal.2d 
209, 224 [209 P.2d 387, 11 A.L.R.2d 835], to situations where 
both judgments are before the court and the essential facts 
in each case are similarly presented and in most particulars 
undisputed. 
The dismissal of the University's appeal from the Lawton 
ruling was based upon a stipulation and was made without 
any inquiry by this court into the merits of the case. Hence 
it affords no basis for a plea of res judicata. Under such cir-
cumstances it is ''an affirmance of the judgment only in a 
limited sense .... At the most, the dismissal prevents a 
second appeal, and relieves the order or judgment from at-
tack for error or irregularity which could have been taken 
ndvantage of upon appeal." (Sullivan v. Gage, 145 Cal. 
759, 770 [79 P. 537].) To the same effect is H award v. 
Howard, 87 Cal.App. 20, 27 [261 P. 714], which says: "In 
our opinion a dismissal of an appeal by the supreme r•ourt 
or district court of appeal for the reason that the appeal 
has not been prosecuted as required by statute and the rules 
governing appeals operate as an affirmance only to the extent 
of precluding further appeal and leaves the judgment ap-
pealed from unimpaired. No court is permitted to pass upon 
issues not before it for determination; and when the appel-
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late court in its order of concludes that there is no 
question to it for hearing, and in effect that the 
appellate jurisdiction has not been invoked, it would seem 
difficult to say that this is a solemn judgment, per se, de-
termining the questions which the court refuses to consider." 
After a judgment has been affirmed on appeal it is the judg-
not the affirmance, which affords basis for the plea of 
res judicata. An affirmance merely supplies the quality of 
finality to the judgment. 
The court erred in finding that the respondents, as adopted 
children of Mrs. Hansen, became members of the class "child 
or children'' and take the trust estate as sole surviving mem-
bers thereof. 
Upon this issue expressed testamentary intent controls, not 
some inflexible rule of substantive law. This is settled by 
Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 265 [196 P.2d 1], wherein the 
question was whether the term "children (lawful issue) " as 
used in the will in relation to collateral relatives included 
or excluded adopted children. In rejecting the contention 
that the inheritance statute (Prob. Code, § 257) controlled 
the decision the court said, at pages 268-270: ''Even though 
an adopted child has a status with respect to its adoptive 
parent identical to that of a child born of such parent and 
succeeds to the estate of an adoptive parent in the same man-
ner as a child born of such parent, it does not follow that 
such status is determinative in construing the terms of a will. 
It is fundamental in the interpretation of wills that the 
testator's intent be derived from the language of the will 
itself and, under Probate Code, section 105, when an uncer-
tainty appears upon the face of the will, from the circum-
stances under which it was executed. . . . In the determina-
tion of the rights of an adopted child under a will, the con-
trolling question is not whether the adopted child would in-
herit from its adoptive parent under the statute of succes-
sion, but whether the adopted child is included among the 
persons the testator intended to share in his estate. . . . 
When statutes like section 108 are not applicable, the rules of 
intestate succession apply only if the testator expresses an 
intention in the will to adopt such rules." It was held that 
parol evidence was properly received and that the court on 
that basis correctly adjudged the adopted children to be ex-
cluded from the class gift in that instance. 
Concerning adopted children the Restatement says in sec-
49C.2d~ 
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tion 287 (page 1520) : "(1) When a limitation is in favor 
of the 'children' of a designated person, all persons adopted 
by the designated person are excluded from the possible takers 
thereunder except when a contrary intent of the conveyor is 
found from additional language or circumstances." 
Comment a at page 1521: "The rule stated in this Section 
narrows the group of 'possible takers' under a limitation in 
favor of the 'children of B' by normally eliminating all chil-
dren adopted by B. Historically, the word 'children' did not 
include anyone except issue of the body of the designated 
parent. No legal method for the adoption of children existed. 
. . . This historically derived restriction upon the inclusive-
ness of the term continues, except when a 'contrary intent of 
the conveyor is found from additional language or circum-
stances.' This continuance finds justification in the obvious 
fact that the conveyor normally does not desire the designated 
parent to have power, by adopting any person he may choose, 
in effect to appoint the subject matter of the conveyance to 
such person. " 
Comment c, page 1522: "The situation most commonly 
within the stated exclusionary rule exists when A executes 
a conveyance containing a limitation in favor of the 'children 
of B,' and B adopts a child subsequent to the time when A 
has lost the power to alter or to eliminate this limitation, as 
for example, when A, being a testator, has died." 
Estate of Clark, supra, 64 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [149 P.2d 
465] : "Under these decisions, Mrs. Dorstewitz could not have 
been vested with an 'indefeasible estate,' for the reason that 
she had died before the termination of the trust. Hence 
her estate could not pass to her adopted children. Under the 
rule of those cases the legatee class at Margaret's death in-
cluded only the surviving, consanguineal posterity of Walter 
C. Miller. (33 C.J. p. 817; Bouvier.)" See also 1 Am.Jur. 
§ 64, p. 665; 95 C.J.S. § 653, p. 954; Annos, in 70 A.L.R. 
621 and 144 A.L.R. 670. 
On the question of Mrs. Stanford's intention it should be 
recognized first that this class gift does not run to her own 
children but to those of a collateral relative. One w'ho takes 
a child into her home through the formal process of adoption 
looks upon her thenceforth as if she were natural b01:n, con-
fers on her all the rights of a natural child, and assumes 
toward her all the obligations owed to issue of her own body. 
When she speaks of her children a natural inference arises 
lhat she includes the adopted one. But the situation is dif-
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ferent with respect to the adoptee of a collateral relative. 
With that artificial relationship testatrix has nothing to do; 
toward that child she has assumed no obligation; when she 
refers to the children of that relative there is no natural basis 
for an inference that she has the adopted child in mind. If 
Mrs. Hansen could bring other relatives, such as Mrs. Reyn-
olds, into the trust through the adoption process, she could 
include strangers in the same way. 
The will was made in 1903, when Mrs. Hansen was 37 years 
of age and her son Walter 13. She had demonstrated her 
ability to reproduce and there was no reason to anticipate 
that there would be any need or occasion for adoption. The 
record is barren of any evidence that the subject had ever 
been discussed or that testatrix had any basis for inferring 
that an adoption would or might take place. It did not 
occur until 19 years after her death, or until after Walter 
had attempted to pass his interest to Mrs. Barton, a complete 
stranger to Mrs. Stanford. The adoptees in this instance 
were an adult woman and her two minor daughters. Prior 
to Mrs. Stanford's death California law did not permit the 
adoption of an adult. (Estate of Taggart, 190 Cal. 493, 
498 [213 P. 504, 27 A.L.R. 1360] .) The law was changed 
in this respect in 1951. ( Civ. Code, § 221; 2 Cal.Jur.2d § 8, 
p. 422.) If Mrs. Stanford be presumed to know the law,7 
that knowledge could not extend to the statutes of New York, 
which did permit the adoption of adults and which was in-
voked by Mrs. Hansen in this instance. 
The will being silent on the subject, there is no basis for 
inferring an intent to include adopted children in the class 
"child or children" unless it be found in testatrix' letter of 
1897 written to Dr. David Starr Jordan, president of the 
University. This was seven years before the making of her 
will. Briefly, it explains the circumstances of taking a niece, 
Jennie L. Lathrop, into her home as a baby and thereafter 
caring for her at different periods; refers to her husband's 
opposition thereto and further says : ''Some might think it 
was adoption which we both felt could never be-and we both 
felt that our heart's best love had been given, never to be 
replaced by any other love for any but our dear son." Also, 
"I must be guarded and careful to let the world and the dear 
child herself know that I had never adopted her .... She 
'It is doubtful that there is any such presumption. See Murphy v. Skef-
teE, 121 Cal.App. 533, 538 [9 P.2d 568], 
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knows full well her true that she has not been adopted 
by me and never can be. And in all my conversations with 
her Father and my brother Charles G. Lathrop I have en-
deavored to impress upon him this fact that I did not look 
upon dear Jennie as my child.'' The trial judge found on the 
basis of this letter that ' to execution of her said will, 
said decedent understood and that the effect 
of adoption was to put the child on the same footing 
as a natural child ; in using the term 'child or children' of 
Aimee L. Hanson, said decedent intended to include and did 
include therein any child or children lawfully adopted by 
Aimee L. Hanson." The letter warrants no such inferences. 
The most that can be inferred therefrom is that Mrs. Stanford 
understood that one who claimed to be her adopted daughter 
might be treated as a pretermitted heir and take a child's 
share in her estate in the absence of provision for her in her 
will. That she also thought that an adopted child of a niece 
would be entitled to any part of her own estate or that her 
silence on the subject would bring that child into her class 
gift is sheer speculation, a mere possibility and no more. 
Possibilities cannot afford legal basis for an inference of fact. 
(Robinson v. Board of Retirement, 140 Cal.App.2d 115, 118 
[294 P.2d 724]; 18 Cal.Jur.2d § 60, p. 479.) Of course, when 
the trier of facts attempts to build inference upon inference, 
the first or basic one must be permissible or the whole struc-
ture collapses. (18 Cal.Jur.2d § 61, p. 481 ;Vaccarezza v. 
Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 698 [163 P.2d 470] .) Funda-
mentally this communication is opposed to the claims of 
adopted children to share in an estate when not specifically 
included in a will. The letter under discussion says: "I 
make this explicit explanation in this letter to you that you 
may hold it sacred and if after my eyes are closed to life 
here, hands are folded and my work finished the subject 
would be discussed whether or not Jennie L. Lathrop had 
been adopted, you can use this letter and defend me." As a 
matter of law this letter affords no basis for the inferences 
drawn by the trial judge and furnishes no support to the 
claims of respondents. This is not a case of a finding based 
upon conflicting substantial evidence, but one of absence of 
any competent evidence to support the finding. The record 
affords no legal basis :for the conclusion that the adoptees, 
respondents herein, became members of the class "child or 
children'' of Amy L. Hansen, or that they are entitled to any 
portion of Mrs. Stanford's estate. 
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the alternative argument that, as-
to be ''a over then 
arises by to the surviving issue of Daniel Lathrop 
in equal shares per stirpes.'' They identify Mrs. Reynolds as 
such, she being the last surviving grandchild of Daniel 
Lathrop. 
Counsel upon such cases as Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal.2d 
885 [206 P.2d 11 A.L.R.2d 672], which states the doctrine 
as follows: ''The implication of gifts in wills rests upon the 
primary rule of construction that the duty of the court in all 
cases of interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the 
maker from the instrument read as a whole and to give effect 
thereto if possible, and it is well settled that, where the in-
tention to make a gift clearly appears in a will, although 
perhaps imperfectly expressed, the court will raise a gift 
by implication. [P. 887.] ... When the intention to make a 
gift clearly appears from the instrument taken by its four 
corners and read as a whole, considering its general scheme, 
the property involved, and the persons named as beneficiaries, 
the gift may be implied. (Estate of Franck, 190 Cal. 28, 31 
[210 P. 417] .) Although the court may not indulge in con-
jecture or speculation simply because the instrument seems 
to have omitted something which it is reasonable to suppose 
should have been provided, a gift will be raised by necessary 
implication where a reading of the entire instrument produces 
a conviction that a gift was intended. [P. 889.] ... Accord-
ingly, in ascertaining the intention of the trustor the court is 
not limited to determining what is meant by any particular 
phrase but may also consider the necessary implication arising 
from the language of the instrument as a whole." [P. 890.] 
Mrs. Reynolds was given outright a share of Ariel's trust 
(above described) upon his death, some $81,250, and has re-
ceived her share of the corpus and accumulated income of 
the trust created by subdivision d of part I of the will, the 
sum of $325,000; a grand total of $406,250. Subdivision d 
contains gifts over, while the one creating Amy Hansen's 
trust (immediately preceding d) stops short of that and 
certainly does not imply a gift over in favor of Mrs. Reynolds 
with respect to the Hansen trust. The discussion of Mrs. 
Stanford's intention concerning adopted children, supra, 
views the will ''taken by its four corners and read as a whole, 
considering its general scheme, the property involved, and 
the persons named as beneficiaries" (quoting Brock v. Hall, 
supra, p. 889), and establishes without necessity of repetition 
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or further elaboration that Mrs. Stanford had no intention 
to give the remainder of the Hansen trust to Mrs. Reynolds 
in preference and to the exclusion of the University. The 
implied gift argument cannot prevail. 
The judgment should be affirmed as to that portion which 
decrees that appellant Barton is not entitled to take, but 
should be reversed in other respects with instructions to 
enter judgment distributing to the Board of Trustees of the 
Leland Stanford Junior University the entire trust estate 
created by subdivision c of section I of the will of testatrix. 
Shenk, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
The petition of appellant Board of Trustees of The Leland 
Stanford Junior University for a rehearing was denied Octo-
ber 16, 1957. Ashburn, J. pro tern.,* participated therein in 
place of Spence, J. Shenk, J., McComb, J., and Ashburn, J. 
pro tern., • were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
[S. F. No. 19760. In Bank. Sept. 20, 1957.] 
STEPHEN M. KOVACIK, Respondent, v. HENRY E. 
REED, Appellant. 
[1] Joint Adventurers- Profits and Losses.-Generally, in the 
absence of an agreement to the contrary the law presumes 
that partners and joint adventurers intended to participate 
equally in the profits and losses of the common enterprise, 
irrespective of any inequality in the amounts each contributed 
to the capital employed in the venture, with the losses being 
shared by them in the same proportions as they share the 
profits. 
[2] !d.-Profits and Losses.-Where one partner or joint adven-
turer contributes the money capital as against the other's skill 
and labor, neither party is liable to the other for contribution 
for any loss sustained; on loss of the money the party who 
contributed it is not entitled to recover any part of it from 
the party who contributed only services. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Joint Adventurers, § 13; Am.Jur., Joint 
Adventurers, § 12. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Joint Adventurers, § 8; [4] Appeal 
and Error, § 1105.1. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
